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Abstract
Today, Japan’s auto industry is renowned for its dominance of foreign markets. Japanese cars are cheap and fuel-efficient,
undercutting larger, more expensive automobiles from Europe and America. Scholarship on recent Japanese industrial development
tends to prioritize a ‘developmental state’ and robust industrial policy in shielding Japanese manufacturers from trade liberalization.
This paper will argue that, while the industrial policy steered by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) played a
significant role in advancing the interests of the Japanese auto industry, it was ultimately the unique trust-based keiretsu
conglomerate structure that gave Japanese auto producers a comparative advantage vis-à-vis their American counterparts. Cost
reduction on the firm level allowed major Japanese automotive companies to skirt free trade measures, simultaneously insulating
their business model from the American led trend towards globalization and trouncing the American automakers, for whom union
politics and steeper production costs encumbered coordinated and strategic growth.

INTRODUCTION
Through both the pre and post-war periods of Japan’s
history, industrial capacity was intimately linked with the

engineering as it is in smart investments, trade, and management
practices.

country’s national interest and identity. One integral component

In this paper I will argue that the story of Japanese

of that industrial capacity was Japan’s automotive industry. The

automotive dominance is only partly explained by Chalmers

cars produced by the major Japanese automakers—Honda,

Johnson’s theory of the “developmental state” and a robust

Toyota, and Nissan—are today as ubiquitous as ever. However,

industrial policy. Rather, Japan’s bid for control of the global

the industry behind the disproportionate amount of cars

auto market was supported primarily by the keiretsu business

imported from a tiny island nation in East Asia informs a

structure which was designed to thwart foreign competition,

broader narrative of US-Japan relations. The story of the rapid

especially from the United States, by keeping costs low and

rise of Japan’s automotive production demonstrates that

supply chains guarded. Moreover, I will explain the ineffective

economic attitudes among producers, rather than government

measures undertaken by the United States to combat the keiretsu

planning, take precedence. How the major Japanese car brands

in the 1995 Auto Dispute, demonstrating the failure of

crafted an industrial strategy to compete with and outpace

American economic policy to outcompete coordinated firm

America’s deep manufacturing base is rooted as much in clever

planning in Japan. The evolution of the shaky US-Japan
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economic alliance throughout the post-war period, with a focus

organized Japanese industry through patent regulation, trade

on the automotive industry, will reveal how Japan “won” the

barriers, and technology transfer restrictions. All of these

globalized auto trade during the 1990s and beyond, establishing

policies can be labeled under the banner of “industrial policy,”

themselves as the premier exporters to the United States of

a phenomenon that economist Robert B. Reich has described

cheap, fuel efficient cars in the 21st century.

as a policy that “focuses on the most productive pattern of

The rapid expansion of the Japanese auto industry in

investment, and thus it favors business segments that promise

the post-war period challenged American automakers on two

to be strong international competitors while helping to develop

fronts: design and cost. Japanese cars were smaller and cheaper,

the industrial infrastructure (highways, ports, sewers) and

designed better for the fuel-conscious urban consumers who

skilled work force needed to support those segments.” MITI,

began to make up a larger and larger share of the American

according to Johnson, was merely the next stage of evolution

market. Furthermore, the 1973 oil crisis sparked a general

for Japan’s prewar controlled economy. While Japanese

market trend which favored smaller, affordable cars, and

government ministries before and during the war mobilized

American autos were large and fuel-inefficient, making them

domestic industry to produce defense technology and wartime

less attractive than their Japanese counterparts. But Japan was

materiel, the post-war attitude focused on dominance in the

not only in the business of making the right car at the right time.

expanding semiconductor and auto industries. Like before,

The unique style of Japanese industrial organization—

Japan endeavored to use targeted industrial policy to decouple

keiretsu—aimed at keeping prices down for Japanese producers

its economic power from constraints on its geography and

while leveraging foreign markets as much as possible.

natural resources. Unlike before, the main exponent of

Ultimately, it was these keiretsus that proved to be the

Japanese industrial policy—MITI—would harness and redirect

determining force in the auto trade between the United States

globalization and trade liberalization rather than aim at pure

and Japan.

autarky.

CHALMERS JOHNSON AND THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Thus, Johnson seeks to prove that there exist sizable
“differences between the course of development of a particular
industry without government policies … and its course of
development with the aid of governmental policies.” Johnson's

In his book MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Chalmers
Johnson argues that the key to Japan’s economic success lay in
a strong industrial policy guided by state authority. MITI, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, steered and
coordinated the Japanese economy out of its post-war malaise.
The policies it supported were guided by an economically
nationalist creed; Johnson writes that MITI “is convinced that
market forces alone will never produce the desired shifts … of
energy and resources into new industries and economic
activities.” Under this broad philosophy, MITI policy
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thesis may not be wrong—industrial policy certainly
contributed to the global ascent of Japanese industry in the latter
half of the 20th century. However, his framing of Japanese
industrial policies ignores some of the key non-governmental
factors—like

the

infamous

keiretsu

structure,

which

exacerbated trade tensions between the United States and Japan
by protecting the auto industry. In light of the oil crisis, low
prices appear to have been the central ingredient of successful
carmaking, and keiretsus allowed for major automakers with
extensive supplier networks to slash production costs through
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lower wages and higher quantity production. An analysis of the

“economic deconcentration,” a policy which aimed at

late history of the auto industry in Japan will, I hope, augment

preventing Japan from being able to leverage a deep industrial

Johnson’s thesis and explain why internal microeconomic

base to pursue future military objectives. The initial American

aspects

of

firm

organization

antagonism

ultimately guided the success of

proprietary

the Japanese auto industry. As we
will see, even the neoliberal
agenda of President Clinton proved
insufficient in breaking the backs
of the keiretsu.

JAPANESE
INDUSTRIAL
STRATEGY IN THE
POST-WAR PERIOD
Prior to World War II,
Japanese industrial capacity was
packaged
monopolistic

into
and

zaibatsu—
oftentimes

dynastic corporate entities which

“The unique style of
Japanese industrial
organization—keiretsu—
aimed at keeping prices
down for Japanese
producers while leveraging
foreign markets as much as
possible. Ultimately, it was
these keiretsus that proved
to be the determining force
in the auto trade between
the United States and
Japan.”

controlled entire industries. The

towards
style

of

Japan’s
industrial

organization would persist, just like
the overall organization of the zaibatsu
themselves. SCAP policy, although
successful in eliminating much of the
crony dynasticism of the major
zaibatsu, did not rid the Japanese
economy of the structural blueprint
created by the zaibatsu. Rather than
disappear, the basic groupings of
companies beneath umbrella holding
companies

that

characterized

the

prewar zaibatsu survived into the
postwar period, with each of the major
Japanese

automotive

companies

retaining the linkages of its respective
zaibatsu network.
In fact, the zaibatsu groupings
remained largely intact, renewed by

zaibatsu organized themselves around “holding companies,

re-investment in the same type of interlocking stockholding

interlocking directorships, and mutual stockholdings,” as well

arrangements which connected the prewar monopolies, albeit

as “Extremely large financial power in the form of commercial

without the aegis of a large bank to provide liquidity to the

bank credit.” This organizational structure likely gave Japan an

affiliate zaibatsu companies.

advantage in wartime, as their industrial capacity was retooled

the aftermath of the American occupation bore many of the

for military hardware and industry entered an autarkic phase.

same features of their zaibatsu predecessors.

Moreover, the enmeshed zaibatsu acted as their own support

networks of similar firms linked by similar interests in keeping

system, with each of the three major zaibatsu families—

the prices of auto parts down and keeping exports boosted. The

Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Yasuda—owning a

Japanese auto industry, once woven into the zaibatsu system,

significant percentage of the banks of the other zaibatsu. In the

was in the postwar period organized into vertical keiretsus.

aftermath of the war, the zaibatsu drew the ire of American

These arrangements aimed at controlling the supply chain of

bureaucrats and military officials like Major General William

manufacturing for a given good—automobiles in this case—in

Marquat, who broke up the zaibatsu in order to achieve

order to internalize input costs and achieve a close level of
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cooperation which could outcompete foreign automakers. As

distinctly Japanese phenomenon—the culmination of a tradition

opposed to the prewar zaibatsus, the keiretsus were not

of Japanese industrial discipline and strategy begun in the Meiji

organized centrally by a family-owned banking trust. Rather,

Restoration.

they were vertically or horizontally integrated supply chains
which fostered close cooperation between keiretsu members in

From the view of an American firm, each of the major

order to cut costs and reduce competition for inputs in order to

Japanese

automakers—Honda,

Toyota,

Nissan,

and

strategize years into the future. Gone was the characteristic

Mitsubishi—maintained their own keiretsu. With the exception

zaibatsu family structure, which was viewed by General

of Mitsubishi, which can be classified as a horizontal keiretsu

MacArthur’s economic advisors as an autarkic obstacle to a

due to its involvement in multiple industries in addition to auto

democratic Japanese political economy.

manufacturing, the auto conglomerates each organized their

In the post-war keiretsus, the linkages between a

own, distinct supply chains. This system reduced competition

primary auto manufacturing firm, like Toyota, Honda, or

between automakers and siloed production via interlocking

Nissan, and their subsidiary auto parts and affiliate firms were

shareholding agreements and long term contracts between

governed primarily by a mutual goal of maximizing economic

suppliers and automakers. To an extent, the auto industry in

production. In the automotive industry, cost reduction on a per-

Japan was anti-competitive vis-à-vis foreign firms. However,

firm basis of even the smallest percentage can yield large

Japanese automakers, aided by MITI’s protectionist policy still

savings and higher profitability when extrapolated to the entire

competed against one another on the issue of engineering and

industry. Moreover, in the resource intensive car industry, the

design to capture the global market. The industry was not a

central nodes of the keiretsus—the automakers themselves—

cartel, so much as it was a highly coordinated oligopoly.

could dominate the network, demanding cost cutting from their

Without the influence of MITI, the automobile industry in Japan

affiliates in return for the promise of greater bulk orders and

could not have enjoyed such high levels of success abroad.

business aid to the smaller firms. The stability of this keiretsu

Without the keiretsus, they could not have sustained growth and

system in the automotive industry “increases the self-

production on the global scale.

sufficiency of the keiretsu and promotes long-term cooperation
through mutual sustenance.” The mutual dependencies created
by the keiretsu networks among Japanese automakers and part
suppliers allowed for a unique bargaining environment which
gave Japan an advantage over the auto industry in the United
States: cheaper car production.

KEIRETSU ORGANIZATION: A FIRM
LEVEL VIEW

Keiretsus were bonded together by creating economies
of scale for all members of the conglomerate and by reducing
production costs for those members. One of the largest sources
of cost-reduction for the large producer firms was in wages—in
1960, wages at smaller subcontracting firms were 60% of the
larger firms which they supplied. Low wages were reinforced
by the Japanese tradition of lifetime employment, which made
suppliers reluctant to hiring new employees, instead waiting to
phase out a generation of workers. Keeping labor entrenched in
the keiretsu system resulted in cost savings on all levels. These

The strength of the keiretsus lay in the advantages they

features made the relationship particularly advantageous to a

conferred to their members. In many ways, the keiretsu was a

company like Toyota or Nissan, for whom lower domestic input
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costs increased competitiveness on the international market.

to the automotive development process. These types of

Moreover, smaller firms were rewarded for their willingness to

meetings, in which suppliers were directly involved in the

supply inputs at a lower cost with larger purchase orders. The

design process, were a unique feature of Toyota’s corporate

inter-firm relationships established in the keiretsu structure

style. They allowed the affiliate firms of Toyota’s keiretsu to

limited the flexibility of smaller firms and enhanced the

participate directly in product-development meetings, thus

profitability of larger firms.

expediting the time it would take to design and produce a car
and fostering closer interpersonal relationships between

Why did American firms not emulate their Japanese
competitors?

producer and supplier. As is apparent from the name, the obeya

The reason is primarily cultural: Japanese

were an explicitly Japanese phenomenon, originating from the

automakers maintained a high degree of trust with their supplier

Toyota Motor Corporation. While American firms would later

firms, while American automakers kept suppliers at arms-

adapt to the Japanese style of auto manufacturing, the obeya

length.

Interlocking shareholding agreements and consulting

strengthened the keiretsus and simplified Toyota’s car

and business assistance followed purchase orders. On average,

development timeline. And obeyas were not an isolated aspect

Japanese automaker-supplier relationships had endured for an

of the keiretsu system. Rather, they were part and parcel of a

average of more than 40 years by the turn of the 21st century.

broader network effect of the keiretsus that allowed the member

Established, institutional trust was a hallmark concept of the

firms to outcompete their foreign competitors by making

Japanese keiretsus, and one which was completely foreign to

cheaper cars in higher volumes, leveraging close, trust-built

American automakers. The story of the keiretsu, therefore, is a

relationships to streamline production.

story of American industrial sclerosis and Japanese industrial
innovation.

Automotive keiretsus were also bonded together by a
system of “mutual sustenance” that ensured that the business
success of the central carmaker would trickle down to the parts

ADVANTAGES OF KEIRETSU
MEMBERSHIP

suppliers. Honda would routinely offer advice and business
support to its suppliers, helping improve their profitability and
in turn securing the relationship for Honda’s future production
needs. This facet of the keiretsu structure was grounded upon

Keiretsu membership was an appealing proposition for
member firms for many reasons, but the most important were
the following: the potential for a robust supplier-producer
relationship in which suppliers oftentimes advised or invested
in their supplier affiliates, and the economic protection offered
by a larger firm with production capacity around the globe.
At Toyota, keiretsu negotiations between auto
executives and suppliers were conducted in large conference
rooms known as obeyas. The primary function of these rooms

the principle that investing in the member firms would translate
to long term growth investment in the larger automakers. Rather
than laid out in a contract, the resulting relationship which
developed between the affiliates and their keiretsu partners was
one “based on trust, cooperation, and educational support for
suppliers.”

participants far outweighed the potential downsides of such
coordination, allowing all firms to engage in economies of scale
in a less competitive business environment.

was to facilitate cooperation and information sharing between
all sectors—supply, design, engineering, and finance—integral

The stability which this model afforded to all

Overall, the keiretsu corporate structure gave the
Japanese auto industry the microeconomic flexibility to make
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larger investments in international growth. Within the keiretsus,

with an industry that was so internally coordinated. Japanese

profit incentives for both automakers and their suppliers

trade representative Hidetoshi Ukawa stated in an interview that

enjoyed a direct relationship. In the United States, however,

“we [the Japanese] can't dictate the size of our [auto] exports to

such buyer-seller networks simply did not exist. On top of that,

the U.S. market. That depends on the American consumer.”

the trust-based relationships upon which the keiretsus operated

This attitude towards the auto trade reflected in Japan an

also made outside suppliers and producers less appealing to

understanding mirrored by the keiretsu arrangements—that

keiretsu member firms, creating a sort of trade barrier

under the pressures of trade liberalization and globalization,

independent of government intervention. That trade barrier was

cost-reduction and industrial coordination would yield

strengthened as much by the guarantee of economies of scale as

marketplace dominance in the vital auto industry. Cheaper

by a recognition that all Japanese firms would act cohesively.

production costs stemming from low wages met demand for

Keiretsu member firms with long term contracts to the central

cheaper cars, and Japan was able to make those cheaper cars,

automaker would rather continue their bilateral relationship

largely independent of MITI policy.

with that firm than sell to a foreign automaker, with whom they

American demand for Japanese cars was so high in the

would not have had the advantage of a shared culture or national

early 1980’s, that, in 1985, MITI announced the continuation of

interest.

That exclusivity, and the commercial security it

a Voluntary Restraint Agreement to limit the amount of auto

afforded, undoubtedly shaped the impenetrability of the

exports Japan shipped to the United States. The 1985 VRA had

keiretsus to American competitors.

While Japan’s keiretsus

been in place several years prior and responded to the concerns

were at their height, foreign competitors could not leverage

of the US automakers, who believed Japan was becoming a

trust-based relationships with producers to keep prices down

hegemonic force in the automotive industry: between 1969 and

and make long term investments. Given the international

1985 Japan increased its share of global car production from

circumstances of the 1973 oil crisis, the internal management of

3.6% to 25.5%.

auto firms mattered substantially more on a basis of cost

industry, the Americans stagnated. Economics reporter Hobart

savings, far more than MITI’s capacity to restrict or subsidize

Rowen wrote in The Washington Post that, “the American

trade and industry.

industry did almost nothing to make itself competitive with

.

producers of small Japanese cars. The VRA never was linked to

THE

AMERICAN

RESPONSE

TO

JAPANESE INCURSION
The background of the keiretsu industrial structure in
Japan provides ample contrast with the automotive industry in

But instead of catching up to the Japanese

specific investment decisions or wage concessions.” In other
words, the American automakers did little to recalibrate their
investments in relation to Japanese market expansion.
While the American auto industry continued to putter
along, producing large, fuel inefficient cars, the Japanese built

the United States. While major Japanese auto manufacturers

up their portfolio of factories in the United States, continuing to

leveraged their industrial organization in order to cut costs,

poach business even under the VRA. By subverting the VRA

shield their domestic market from foreign competition, and

and relocating a share of production to the U.S. mainland, the

flood the international marketplace with cheap cars, American

Japanese auto industry, independent of MITI’s direction,

automakers lacked the adaptability and flexibility to compete

improved its condition. The VRA merely served as a signal to
redirect investment to cope with the pressures of trade

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol1/iss1/33

6
6

Boers: How Japanese Automakers Thwarted American Competition

SOCIAL
SCIENCES | Economic History and International Relations
Social Sciences

VOL. 1.1 | Nov. 2020

liberalization. And voluntary agreements could only go so far

Japanese automakers, on the Japanese mainland or in the US,

towards securing a future for US automakers—in the wake of

where the Japanese sought to avoid the management problem of

the VRA, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Mitsubishi all made

unionization. Therefore, the issue of unions, although isolated

investments in US plants and negotiated to supply US

internally within the domestic politics of Japan and the US, had

automakers with engine parts and in some cases even whole cars

an external effect on the balance of trade between the two

to fill the subcompact range.

The major Japanese firms also

countries. Overall, industrial organization and management-

entered into “joint-venture” agreements with their American

level decision making can reflect massive differences in

counterparts, agreeing to supply US automakers with parts, and

profitability and market share in the auto industry. While the

in some cases even mass purchase orders for finished autos.

Japanese utilized keiretsus to cut costs and pursued a policy of

American firms ultimately found it more profitable to enter

non-unionization in the United States to keep wages down,

contractual agreements with larger Japanese firms.

Japanese

American manufacturers could not match the pricing nor

producers were simply better equipped with their keiretsu cost

possessed the business flexibility to meet changing consumer

savings to dominate the global market for small cars. Under the

demand.

VRA, which was official MITI policy, the Japanese automakers
adjusted short term investments in ways which would serve their
long term export ambitions and corner American automakers on
their home field.

THE 1995 AUTO DISPUTE: KEIRETSUS
IN DIPLOMACY

On the American front, the development of
auto manufacturing had been enjoying steady growth since the
beginning of the postwar period. That growth among the Big
Three automakers—Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors—
however, was halted by the oil crisis, and between 1972 and
1980 imports of cars, mostly from Japan, grew from 15 to 27
percent. In the preceding years, stability in the auto industry
had handed the United Auto Workers a considerable amount of
political power, forcing wages for auto workers up and thus
squeezing the auto industry’s ability to respond to changing
consumer demand. Thus a void was opened and promptly filled
by small Japanese cars. Unlike in the United States, Japanese

The tensions from the era of the VRA continued into
the 1990’s, proving that the auto trade surplus which Japan
enjoyed with the United States was relatively immune to trade
restrictions. These tensions between the United States and
Japan came to a fore in the 1995 auto dispute, in which President
Clinton threatened to enact $6 billion in tariffs on luxury auto
imports to the US from Japan in response to Japanese
unwillingness to make room for American auto part imports in
Japan. The lesson of the dispute, and its recognition of the
increasingly globalized supremacy of the Japanese auto
industry, speaks to the potency of Japan’s keiretsus to delay and
avoid trade liberalization.

auto worker unions, like the Toyota Motor Workers Union, were
more or less subservient to the corporation whose employees
they represented.

This symbiotic relationship contrasted

heavily with the large concessions demanded by UAW
representatives of the Big Three. A 1998 UAW led strike on
General Motors contributed to a daily loss of $80 million
dollars.

The dispute, which arose out of a complaint launched
against Japan by the United States and the WTO, reflected
American exasperation with Japan’s growing automotive
power.

While Japanese companies continued to undercut

American competitors by using the unique structure of the
keiretsus to avert steep supply costs, this strategy also limited

Such strikes were nonexistent in the factories of
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the power of American companies to export to Japan. This

A Harvard Business School Report on the “new

imbalance produced a Japanese auto parts market of which

keiretsus” asserts that “the essence of keiretsu has proved

Americans made up 2.6%, and an American market of which

durable, and the ability to avoid the hidden costs of Western-

the Japanese made up 32.5%.

style supplier relationships is an important reason.”

Under the agreement, the

The

American threat of sanctions brought the Japanese to concede

keiretsu structure has largely survived, despite the recent global

non-specific import quotas. While the official terms of the

movement towards market liberalization, led often by the

agreement seemed to benefit both sides—Japan avoiding costly

United States. The fact that keiretsus have seemed to be so

tariffs and the United States’ suppliers gaining a foothold in the

impenetrable in the auto industry is largely a testament to their

seemingly impenetrable Japanese market, the lack of concrete

ability to coexist with, adapt to, and sometimes even determine

steps to address the trade imbalance was flagrant. For one, the

the course of state policy and diplomatic agreements. The 1985

keiretsus of the auto industry openly opposed the import quotas,

VRA extension and the 1995 auto dispute both allowed the auto

as ceding a portion of their supplier network to foreign

industry to utilize their efficient keiretsu business structure to

competition would undoubtedly hurt their bottom line. As a

work around political conditions which were hostile to the

result, there were no concrete quotas enacted under the

growing Japanese trade surplus. In each case, it was the keiretsu

agreement, as Japanese industry had the final say, thus exposing

which offered the Japanese auto industry a competitive

the discrepancy between the perceived power of MITI to put

advantage, allowing them to cut costs and reshuffle investments

Japanese industries in line and the relative independence of the

to box out foreign competition. It is this story then, in addition

auto industry on matters of trade. Americans recognized this

to the story that Chalmers Johnson tells in MITI and the

issue, and the New York Times reported that “the issue [of the

Japanese Miracle, which explains the rapid ascent of Japanese

auto dispute] was considered critical to breaking the “keiretsu”

auto manufacturing in the postwar era.

system of suppliers, which [had] been blamed for many of the

.

troubles American companies encounter in Japan.” Just a few

ENDNOTES

years before the dispute erupted, Japan’s trade surplus with the
United States also became a point of contention for third party
presidential candidate Ross Perot, who often remarked on the
declining caliber of US auto manufacturing and the necessity of
bolstering domestic production with industrial policy. Overall,
the trade dispute points to the fact that the CEOs of Japan’s
automakers would eventually determine the success of the
agreement, dictating to the American their adjustments to
import buying, not vice-versa. The survival of the profitable
keiretsus, rather than MITI’s policy, once again seemed to
directly affect Japan’s global automotive reach.

CONCLUSION
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